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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of risk measures and theories of
choice for modeling risk-averse route choice and traffic network equi-
librium with random travel times. We interpret the postulates of these
theories in the context of routing, and we identify additive consistency
as a plausible and relevant condition that allows to reduce risk-averse
route choice to a standard shortest path problem. Within the classical
theories of choice under risk, we show that the only preferences that
satisfy this consistency property are the ones induced by the entropic
risk measures.
1 Introduction
Drivers are aware that travel time cannot be reliably predicted and is subject
to random fluctuations arising from a multitude of factors such as conges-
tion, weather conditions, accidents and traffic incidents, bottlenecks, traffic
light disruptions, unexpected actions by pedestrians and other drivers, and
so on. Even on a specific road segment at a specific time of the day, travel
time exhibits a stochastic pattern that can be roughly approximated by the
∗This work was supported by FONDECYT 1100046 and Nu´cleo Milenio Informacio´n
y Coordinacio´n en Redes ICM/FIC P10-024F.
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log-normal or Burr distributions [18, 49]. Thus, choosing a route to travel
from a given origin to a destination is essentially a matter of comparing
random variables. A basic question here is to understand the mechanisms
by which these choices are made. While this calls for modeling the actual
behavior of drivers, it can also be approached from a normative angle by
asking which are the properties that characterize a rational route choice
under risk. A related issue is to understand the consequences of risk-averse
behavior upon congestion and the traffic equilibrium that is obtained. An-
swering these questions may change the way in which we model traffic and
can be relevant for network design and traffic control.
Route preferences vary among individuals and also depending on trip pur-
pose. Compare for instance a situation in which you must arrive on time to
an important meeting, with that of a tourist strolling leisurely through the
city, or still a fire truck heading towards an emergency. While a risk neu-
tral driver may only care about the expected travel time, a risk-averse user
will be more concerned with travel time reliability. Modeling such variety
of behaviors has been approached with different tools. Mean-risk models
—with risk quantified by the expected value plus the standard deviation—
were considered by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [35] to study both atomic and
non-atomic equilibria. An algorithm to compute mean-stdev optimal paths
was given by Nikolova et al. [33, 34]. Route choice using α-percentiles was
investigated by Ordon˜ez and Stier-Moses [39] and Nie [31], the former con-
sidering also an approach using robust optimization. Yet another proposal
by Nie and Wu [32] uses preferences based on the on-time arrival probability.
An algorithm for this objective function was also given by Nikolova et al.
[34]. Finally, Nie et al. [30, 53] develop a model that uses stochastic domi-
nance constraints. For a more detailed account of these and other relevant
references we refer to §5 and to the literature review included in [35].
s j d
Z
Y
X
Figure 1: A paradoxical route choice
In all the approaches just mentioned it may happen that a riskX is preferred
to Y but the preference is reversed when we add an independent risk Z. In
the simple network illustrated in figure 1 this means that if we go from s to j
our best choice is the upper link, but if we extend our trip to d then we must
change our choice to the lower link. This may appear as paradoxical. For a
concrete example, consider the mean-stdev map ρstdγ (X) = E(X) + γσ(X)
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with γ = 1 and independent normal variables X ∼ N(11, 1), Y ∼ N(10, 5),
Z ∼ N(10, 2), where ρstdγ (X) = 12 < ρstdγ (Y ) = 10 +
√
5, but ρstdγ (X +Z) =
21 +
√
3 > ρstdγ (Y + Z) = 20 +
√
7. In this paper we use the theories of
choice and risk measures to characterize the so-called additive consistent
preferences that are free from these paradoxes. We prove that these are
exactly the preferences associated with the entropic risk measures.
The general theory of choice under risk is a well established field with a long
history. In this setting, an agent is described by a preference relation over a
set of random variables (or their distributions). Under suitable conditions
these preferences can be represented by a scalar function. Representations
by expected utilities were already considered by Bernoulli [5] and further de-
veloped by Kolmogorov [26], Nagumo [29], de Finetti [8], and von Neumann
and Morgenstern [51] (see also [14, Fishburn]). Expected utilities were used
by Arrow [2] and Pratt [41] to define a local index of absolute risk aversion
that reflects the risk attitudes of an agent. However, empirical evidence
shows that agents do not always conform to the postulates of expected util-
ity theory, and the crucial independence axiom is sometimes violated (see [1,
Allais], [12, Ellsberg], [25, Kahneman and Tversky]). By modifying the inde-
pendence axiom, several alternative representations have emerged: the dual
theory of choice by Yaari [54], the anticipated utility theory by Quiggin [42],
the rank-dependent expected utility theory by Wakker [52] and Chateauneuf
[6], and Schmeidler’s approach [47] based on subjective probabilities.
On the other hand, the extensive use of Value-at-Risk in finance gave birth to
the notion of risk measure as an alternative tool for studying choice under
risk. The axiomatic approach to risk measures was initiated by Artzner
et al. [3], who also introduced the Average Value-at-Risk as a coherent
risk measure that overcomes some limitations of Value-at-Risk. Mean-risk
functionals have also been considered in this context, notably by Ogryczak
and Ruszczynski [37] who studied a risk measure that combines the expected
value and the standard semi-deviations. To some extent, risk measures
can be unified with the theories of choice through the concept of premium
principles (see Gerber [19], Goovaerts et al. [20, 21], Denuit et al. [10], and
Tsanakas and Desli [50]). A recent account of theories of choice and risk
measures can be found in the book by Fo¨llmer and Schied [17].
Our contribution: In this paper we investigate the use of risk measures
and theories of choice to model risk-averse routing. The interpretation of
the postulates in this context leads us to identify additive consistency as a
plausible and relevant condition that extends the notion of translation in-
variance and reduces risk-averse route choice to a standard shortest path
problem. We briefly discuss how this allows to formulate risk-averse equilib-
rium models for atomic and non-atomic network flows, which naturally fit
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in the framework of congestion games. We then investigate additive consis-
tency in some standard settings of theories of choice proving that, within the
classes of distorted risk measures as well as rank dependent utilities, the only
maps that satisfy additive consistency are the entropic risk measures. We
also show that these are the only expected utility maps that are translation
invariant, hence the only risk measures in this class. These results extend
Gerber [19], Goovaerts et al. [22], Heilpern [23], and Luan [27].
Structure of the paper: In section §2 we recall the postulates of risk
measures and their induced preferences, interpreting them in the context of
route choice. We introduce the concept of additive consistency and discuss
its application to risk-averse path choice and network equilibrium. In §3 we
consider consecutively the classes of expected utility maps (§3.1), distorted
risk measures (§3.2), and rank dependent utilities (§3.3), proving that within
each of these classes the entropic risk measures are the only ones that satisfy
translation invariance and/or additive consistency. In §4 we make some
remarks on the use of dynamic risk measures as an alternative to model
route choice, and we conclude in §5 with a brief discussion of related work.
2 Risk measures and additive consistency
Quantifying risk is an essential yet difficult task. Because of the subjective
nature of risk perception, defining an appropriate measure remains contro-
versial and several approaches have been proposed each one with its own
advantages and limitations. A risk quantification attaches a scalar value to
each random variable X : Ω → R, where Ω is a set of events endowed with
a σ-algebra F and a probability measure P. More precisely, a risk measure
is a map ρ : X → R defined over a prospect space X (a linear space of ran-
dom variables containing the constants, usually a subspace of L∞(Ω,F ,P))
which satisfies the following postulates:
• normalization: ρ(0) = 0,
• monotonicity: if X ≤ Y almost surely then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ),
• translation invariance: ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m for all m ∈ R.
Such a map induces a preference relation X E Y ⇔ ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) which
defines a complete order. In this paper prospects are interpreted as costs or
disutilities so that smaller values are preferred and, against common usage,
X E Y is read as “X is preferred to Y ”. Naturally, the normal convention
applies if X represents a utility and larger values are better. We use X⊳Y to
denote strict preference and we write X ∼ Y when simultaneously X E Y
and Y E X.
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The normalization axiom is not restrictive as one can always take ρ(X)−ρ(0)
instead of ρ(X). Monotonicity has a clear intuitive meaning: larger costs
convey higher risk. In the context of routing, paths with larger travel times
are riskier and less preferred. Translation invariance is equivalent (under
normalization) to requiring simultaneously
• normalization on constants: ρ(m) = m for all m ∈ R.
• translation consistency: ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y )⇒ ρ(X +m) ≤ ρ(Y +m).
The latter is a plausible condition stating that preferences between prospects
are not altered when we add them a constant. While this postulate is not
universally accepted in finance (attitudes towards risk might change after
receiving a heritage), it seems very likely in the context of route choice (see
§2.2). Finally, normalization on constants is also a mild requirement: it
suffices to have m 7→ ρ(m) strictly increasing and continuous, since then
this function has an inverse σ and we may substitute ρ by σ ◦ ρ.
The axiomatic approach to risk measures was initiated by [3, Artzner et al.]
who introduced the notion of a coherent risk measure, namely, a risk measure
which is also sub-additive and positively homogeneous. Positive homogeneity
translates the notion of scale invariance, while sub-additivity captures the
idea that a merger of two risks cannot create additional risk. The validity
of these axioms in finance has been thoroughly debated in the literature. In
the context of route choice these assumptions seem less natural, specially
positive homogeneity. A weaker property is convexity which still supports a
useful dual representation for risk measures [15, 16, 17].
Preferences can also be modeled directly as a preorder, namely a reflexive
and transitive relation E. We then say that E is represented by ρ : X → R
if X E Y ⇔ ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ). The following simple result clarifies when both
modeling approaches coincide.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose E is a preorder that satisfies
• monotonicity: if X ≤ Y almost surely then X E Y ,
• translation consistency: if X E Y then X +m E Y +m for m ∈ R,
• real ordering: for X,Y constant we have X E Y ⇔ X ≤ Y ,
• scalarization: for each X ∈ X there is a unique α ∈ R with X ∼ α.
Then the map X 7→ ρ(X) = α defined by the last condition is a risk measure
and E is represented by ρ.
Proof. Reflexivity of E gives X ∼ X so that for X ≡ m constant we get
ρ(m) = m which shows that ρ is normalized on constants. Next, by defini-
tion we have X ∼ ρ(X) and translation consistency gives X+m ∼ ρ(X)+m
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so that ρ(X+m) = ρ(X)+m proving the translation invariance of ρ. Since
the monotonicity of E readily implies the monotonicity of ρ, it follows that
ρ is a risk measure. It remains to establish the representation property.
By definition we have X ∼ ρ(X) and Y ∼ ρ(Y ) so that transitivity gives
X E Y iff ρ(X) E ρ(Y ). According to the real ordering axiom, the latter is
equivalent to ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
As a corollary to Proposition 2.1 the preorder E must be complete, that is,
all pairs are comparable. This also follows directly from the real ordering
and scalarization axioms. Scalarization is a non-trivial condition. In section
§3 we will revise this postulate in the light of the theories of choice.
2.1 Examples and counterexamples of risk measures
A first attempt to quantify risk was given in [28, Markowitz] by considering
the mean-risk functional
ρvarγ (X) = µ(X) + γσ
2(X)
with µ(X) the mean of X, σ2(X) its variance, and γ > 0 a positive constant.
Variations of this idea substitute the variance by the standard deviation
ρstdγ (X) = µ(X) + γσ(X)
or other variability measures such as the absolute semi-deviations [37, 38].
While these maps satisfy normalization and translation invariance, they are
not risk measures since monotonicity might fail: take X ∼ U [0, 1] a uniform
variable and Y = (1 + X)/2 so that X ≤ Y almost surely, yet for γ large
we have ρvarγ (Y ) < ρ
var
γ (X) and the same for ρ
std
γ .
A popular measure is Value-at-Risk defined for p ∈ (0, 1) as the percentile
VaRp(X) = inf {m ∈ R : P(X ≤ m) ≥ 1− p} .
This is a risk measure which is also positively homogeneous, but not convex
nor sub-additive (see [3]). The best known coherent risk measure is Average
Value-at-Risk, introduced in [3] and defined for a level p ∈ (0, 1) by
AVaRp(X) =
1
p
∫ p
0
VaRq(X)dq,
which also has the following useful dual representation (cf. [15, 16, 43, 44])
AVaRp(X) =
1
p
inf
z∈R
{E((X − z)+) + pz} .
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AVaR is also known by the names of Conditional Value-at-Risk, Tail Value-
at-Risk, and Expected Shortfall. For continuous variables it coincides with
the Tail Conditional Expectation
TCEp(X) = E(X|X ≥ VaRp(X)).
Note that when restricted to normal random variables both VaRp and AVaRp
coincide with ρstdγ for appropriate corresponding constants γ.
A family of convex (but not coherent) risk measures are the entropic mea-
sures defined as (cf. [15, 16, 17, 46])
ρentβ (X) =
1
β
ln(E(eβX)).
These measures play a central role in our results. They can be derived from
additive premium principles [19, Gerber], as well as from expected utilities
with constant absolute risk aversion CARA ([2, Arrow], [41, Pratt]). The
case β > 0 characterizes risk-averse behavior while β < 0 corresponds to
a risk-prone agent. The limit β → 0 gives ρent0 (X) = E(X) which reflects
risk neutrality, while β → ±∞ yields extreme attitudes toward risk with
ρent∞ (X) = ess supX and ρ
ent
−∞(X) = ess infX. In the sequel we only con-
sider finite β’s and exclude the last two.
2.2 Risk measures and consistency in route choice
Consider a driver who must choose one among a finite set of routes, each
of which has a random travel time in a suitable prospect space X . While a
risk-neutral driver may prefer the route with smallest expected time (eas-
ily computed by any shortest path algorithm), a risk-averse user might be
willing to trade some expected value against increased reliability.
We assume that the driver preferences E satisfy the axioms in Proposition
2.1, so that route choice is based on a risk measure ρ : X → R. As already
mentioned, the scalarization postulate is a nontrivial assumption which will
be discussed later. In contrast, the axioms of monotonicity and real ordering
seem quite innocuous, while translation consistency is also very plausible in
this context. Namely, consider the simple network illustrated in figure 2
with two paths from s to j with random times X and Y , followed by a
single path from j to d with constant time Z ≡ m. Translation consistency
simply requires that a driver who prefers X to Y for moving from s to j,
should have the same preference when heading towards d.
A stronger consistency property requires the preservation of preferences
when Z is no longer constant but still independent from X and Y , namely,
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s j d
Z ≡ m
Y
X
Figure 2: Translation invariance and additive consistency
if X E Y then X + Z E Y + Z for all Z ⊥ (X,Y ). Intuitively, since the
arc (j, d) is compulsory and one must inevitably pass through it, the deci-
sion at s should not depend on Z. This seems all the more plausible since,
due to the independence, even if one observes Z this reveals no information
that could affect the choice between X and Y . This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 2.1 (Additive consistency). A map ρ : X → R is called additive
consistent if for all X,Y,Z ∈ X with Z ⊥ (X,Y ) we have
ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) ⇒ ρ(X + Z) ≤ ρ(Y + Z).
For risk measures this is equivalent to an apparently stronger requirement
of additivity for sums of independent risks. The proof is elementary.
Lemma 2.1. Let ρ : X → R be a risk measure. Then ρ is additive consistent
if and only if ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ X with X ⊥ Y . A
map satisfying the latter is called additive.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious so we just prove the “only if”. Let X ⊥ Y .
Since X ∼ ρ(X), from additive consistency we get X + Y ∼ ρ(X) + Y .
Hence ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(ρ(X) + Y ) and the translation invariance of ρ yields
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
It is well known that the entropic risk measures ρentβ are additive and hence
additive consistent. The counterexample in the Introduction (see figure 1)
shows that this is not the case for ρstdγ . The example was for γ = 1 but it
can be readily adapted to any γ > 0. Thus, in general ρstdγ is not additive
consistent, and a fortiori neither VaRp nor AVaRp since they coincide with
ρstdγ for normal variables. In section §3 we show that, among a wide class of
risk measures, the entropic ones are the only that are additively consistent.
Remark. The use of normal distributions in the counterexample in the
Introduction could raise some objections since these are unbounded and have
positive mass on the negative reals, so they might not represent travel times.
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However, the example is robust and can be modified to get distributions with
bounded support on R+: it suffices to shift the variables by a large common
constant so that the mass on R− becomes negligible, and then truncate to
a large interval [0,M ] and take conditional distributions.
2.3 Application to risk-averse network equilibrium
Additive consistency is a plausible assumption with interesting consequences
for the computation of risk-minimizing routes and risk-averse network equi-
librium. Consider a network G = (V,A) in which every link a ∈ A has a
random travel time τa and assume that these variables are independent. Let
P be the set of paths connecting a given origin s to a destination d, and for
each p ∈ P denote Tp =
∑
a∈p τa the corresponding travel time. Given a
risk measure ρ we consider the problem of finding a risk-minimizing path
min
p∈P
ρ(Tp). (2.1)
When ρ is additive the objective function separates as ρ(Tp) =
∑
a∈p ρ(τa)
and (2.1) reduces to a standard shortest path problem with arc lengths
wa = ρ(τa). This can be efficiently solved using standard algorithms.
Consider now a non-atomic equilibrium problem with traffic demands gk ≥ 0
for a family of origin-destination pairs (sk, dk)k∈K. The demands decompose
into path-flows xp ≥ 0 so that gk =
∑
p∈Pk
xp where Pk denotes the set of
paths connecting sk to dk. The cumulative flow on a link a ∈ A is then
ya =
∑
p∋a xp where the sum extends to all paths p ∈ ∪k∈KPk containing a.
Suppose that the distribution τa ∼ Fa(ya) depends on the total link flow ya.
We may then define a risk-averse network equilibrium as a path-flow vector
x which uses only risk-minimizing paths, namely, for each OD pair k ∈ K
and every path p ∈ Pk we must have
xp > 0⇒ ρ(Tp) = min
r∈Pk
ρ(Tr).
If ρ is additive and the function σa(ya) , ρ(τa) increases with ya, this reduces
to a standard Wardrop equilibrium and equilibria are characterized as the
optimal solutions of the convex program
min
(x,y)∈F
∑
a∈A
∫ ya
0
σa(z) dz (2.2)
where F stands for the set of all feasible flows satisfying flow conservation.
A similar model can be stated in the atomic case with finitely many players.
Each player i ∈ I choses a path pi from his origin to his destination and gets
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ρ(Tpi) as payoff. Assuming that the distribution of τa ∼ Fa(na) depends on
the number of players that use the link na = |{i ∈ I : a ∈ pi}|, and denoting
σa(na) = ρ(τa), this yields a congestion game which falls in the framework
of Rosenthal and admits the potential function
Φ(pi : i ∈ I) =
∑
a∈A
na∑
z=0
σa(z). (2.3)
In both the atomic and non-atomic settings above, all drivers were assumed
homogeneous with respect to their valuation of risk. In the next section we
show that additive consistency limits the choice to entropic risk measures
so that some similarity among users might be expected, nevertheless they
can still differ in their absolute risk aversion index. The latter calls for an
equilibrium model with multiple user classes, for which one can still establish
the existence of equilibria but a simple variational characterization such as
(2.2) or the existence of a potential function like (2.3) seems unlikely.
3 Theories of choice and additive consistency
The scalarization postulate in Proposition 2.1 is a nontrivial assumption
that needs further justification. The theories of choice provide sufficient
conditions for this property to be satisfied. In particular, a preorder E on
a topological space X has a scalar representation C : X → R if and only if
there is a countable dense subset D ⊂ X such that whenever X ⊳Y one can
find Z ∈ D with X E Z E Y (see [17, Theorem 2.6] and references therein).
Unfortunately this is not enough for our purposes and additional conditions
are needed to get equivalence to a constant X ∼ α. This can be achieved
when X is a prospect space of random variables, in which case more specific
formulas for C(X) can be obtained.
Already in the 18th century, Daniel Bernoulli [5] observed that preferences
on prospects could be represented by an expected utility C(X) = E(c(X)).
Axiomatic approaches for this type of representation were developed among
others by Kolmogorov [26], Nagumo [29], de Finetti [8], and von Neumann
& Morgenstern [51]. Here we consider a version given by Fo¨llmer & Schied
[17]. More recently, alternative representations have been obtained under
different sets of axioms, including the dual theory of choice [54, Yaari] and
the rank-dependent utilities [42, Quiggin], [52, Wakker], [6, Chateauneuf].
Throughout this section we consider a preorder E defined on the whole
space X = L∞(Ω,F ,P) where (Ω,F ,P) is a standard atomless probability
space. We denote Db the set of probability distributions on R with bounded
support so that each X ∈ X has a distribution FX ∈ Db and, by Skorohod’s
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representation theorem [48], all distributions in Db are obtained in this way.
On X we consider the convergence for the L1-norm, denoted Xn → X, as
well as the convergence in distribution: Xn
D→ X iff FXn converges weakly to
FX , that is
∫
R
ϕ(x) dFXn (x) →
∫
R
ϕ(x) dFX (x) for all bounded continuous
functions ϕ : R→ R.
3.1 Expected utility
According to [17, Corollary 2.29], a preorder E over X admits an expected
utility representation of the form1
C(X) = E(c(X)) =
∫
R
c(x) dFX (x),
with c : R → R strictly increasing and continuous (unique up to a positive
affine transformation) if and only if the following axioms are satisfied
(A1) law invariance
2: FX = FY ⇒ X ∼ Y .
(A2) weak continuity: the sets {Y ∈ X : Y E X} and {Y ∈ X : X E Y }
are closed for convergence in distribution.
(A3) independence: if X E Y then L(p;X;Z) E L(p;Y ;Z) for all Z ∈ X
and p ∈ [0, 1]. Here L(p;X;Z) denotes the lottery with distribution
given by αFX(x) + (1− α)FZ(x) for all x ∈ R.
This is a general version of the von Neumann and Morgenstern representa-
tion result [51], originally stated for lotteries over a finite event space. For
further discussions see [9, 13, 14, 17].
In the context of route choice, expected utility preferences hold an intuitive
appeal. Imagine for instance a fire truck rushing towards an emergency.
Clearly enough, reaching the destination as quickly as possible is critical, all
the more since the damage caused by fire increases non-linearly with time.
A route with small expected time but affected by events of high congestion
might be too risky, and a longer but more reliable route could be a better
choice. Expected utility captures the nonlinear relation between “time” and
“cost”, so that minimizing expected cost seems a reasonable model for the
actual behavior of firemen.
The properties of the utility c(·) are naturally connected to those of E. For
instance, c(·) is convex iff E is risk-averse in the sense that the expected
1Since in our settingX represents a cost, it might be more appropriate to call it expected
disutility or expected cost, but we adhere to the standard terminology.
2Note that in this case E induces a preorder  on Db by FX  FY ⇔ X E Y.
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value of a prospect is always preferred to the prospect itself: E(X) E X.
Also c(·) is increasing iff E is monotone, and strictly increasing if X ⊳ Y
whenever X < Y almost surely. In this latter case c(·) has an inverse and
one can also represent E by the so-called certainty equivalent
ρc(X) = c
−1(E(c(X))).
Note that taking α = ρc(X) we have C(α) = c(α) = C(X) so that X ∼ α
and the scalarization postulate in Proposition 2.1 holds true. Moreove, note
that if a preorder E is induced by a map ρ : X → R and satisfies (A1)-(A3),
then ρ is necessarily of the form ρc. For completeness we state this explicitly.
Corollary 3.1. Let ρ : X → R be such that it satisfies
• law invariance: FX = FY ⇒ ρ(X) = ρ(Y ),
• normalization on constants: ρ(m) = m for all m ∈ R,
• strict monotonicity: if X < Y almost surely then ρ(X) < ρ(Y ),
• weak continuity: if Xn D→ X then ρ(Xn)→ ρ(X),
• independence: if ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) then ρ(L(p;X;Z)) ≤ ρ(L(p;Y ;Z)).
Then ρ = ρc for some c : R → R strictly increasing and continuous, and
unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. Let us consider the induced order X E Y ⇔ ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ). The
assumptions imply that E is represented by an expected utility map ρc.
Normalization on constants gives ρ(X) = ρ(ρ(X)) from which we deduce
X ∼ ρ(X) and therefore ρc(X) = ρc(ρ(X)) = ρ(X).
In general ρc is not a risk measure since translation invariance may fail. We
show next that this only holds for the entropic risk measures. This result
goes back to [19, Gerber] where it was proved under the stronger condition
of additivity of ρc and assuming c(·) concave non-decreasing and twice dif-
ferentiable. Under translation invariance, but still assuming regularity of
c(·), the result was proved in [27, Luan] (see also [23, Heilpern]). Our proof
below relies exclusively on continuity and monotonicity. Regularity of c(·)
as well as additivity of ρc are obtained as a consequence.
Theorem 3.1. The only translation invariant maps of the form ρc with
c : R→ R strictly increasing and continuous, are the entropic risk measures
ρentβ (X) =
{
1
β
ln(E(eβX)) if β 6= 0
E(X) if β = 0.
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Proof. Since ρc does not change under affine transformations of c(·), we may
assume c(0) = 0. The translation invariance of ρc gives
c−1 (E(c(X +m))) = c−1 (E(c(X))) +m.
Take X = zBp with z ∈ R and Bp a Bernoulli variable with parameter p.
Developing the left and right hand sides, and using the fact that c(0) = 0,
this equality becomes
c−1 (pc(z +m) + (1− p)c(m)) = c−1 (pc(z)) +m.
Defining ε = c−1(pc(z)) this can be rewritten as
c(ε)[c(z +m)− c(m)] = c(z)[c(m + ε)− c(m)]. (3.1)
Now, since c(·) is increasing it is differentiable almost everywhere. Take any
point m at which c′(m) exists. By considering alternately z > 0 and z < 0
with p → 0+ we have respectively ε → 0+ and ε → 0−. Dividing (3.1) by
ε and noting that c(z) 6= 0 and [c(z +m) − c(m)] 6= 0, it follows that the
lateral derivatives of c(·) at 0 exist and coincide, and moreover we have
c′(0)[c(z +m)− c(m)] = c(z)c′(m). (3.2)
Now that we know that c′(0) exists, we may reuse (3.1) and apply a similar
argument at an arbitrary point m to deduce that c′(m) exists everywhere
and satisfies (3.2). Moreover, since c(·) is strictly increasing the mean value
theorem implies that c′(m) > 0 at some point m, and (3.2) yields c′(0) > 0.
Using an affine transformation (which does not affect ρc) we may assume
c′(0) = 1 and then rearranging (3.2) we get
c(z +m)− c(z) = c(m) + [c′(m)− 1]c(z). (3.3)
Dividing by m > 0 and letting it to 0 it follows that [c′(m)−1]/m has a
limit, which we denote by β, and c(·) satisfies the differential equation
c′(z) = 1 + βc(z).
This has a unique continuous solution with c(0) = 0, namely c(x) = x if
β = 0 and c(x) = [eβx − 1]/β otherwise. The conclusion follows.
3.1.1 The independence axiom and Allais’ paradox
Expected utility theory has not been without critics, mainly focusing on
the independence axiom. The paradoxes of Allais [1] and Ellsberg [12] show
specific contexts in which the independence axiom is violated and agents
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Figure 3: The independence axiom and Allais’ paradox.
do not behave consistently with the predictions of this theory. Further
empirical evidence has been provided by Kahneman and Tversky [25].
To interpret the independence axiom, imagine a driver who has two options
X,Y to travel from j to d of which he prefers X (see figure 3). Suppose now
that he is actually at a point s on the other side of a river, and to reach
the intermediate node j he must first cross a bridge which is open with
probability p, and else take a long detour Z to the destination d. Thus, the
driver faces a choice between the lotteries L(p;X;Z) and L(p;Y ;Z). The
independence axiom postulates that the first should be preferred. While this
seems a reasonable assumption in the route choice setting, Allais observed
that it may fail in other contexts. Specifically, he considered
X = 50, Y =
{
35 with probability 0.8
100 with probability 0.2
, Z = 100.
and noted that while most people prefer X to Y , for p = 0.25 they tend to
choose L(p;Y ;Z) over L(p;X;Z) where
L(p;X;Z) =
{
50 with probability 0.25,
100 with probability 0.75,
L(p;Y ;Z) =
{
35 with probability 0.2,
100 with probability 0.8.
This points to a potential incongruence between the predictions based on
the independence axiom and the actual choices made by agents. However,
it is also true that “context matters” and decisions depend not only on the
way the choice is formulated but even on the form in which information is
communicated and processed. The lotteries above do not describe the route
choice accurately since they obscure the fact that here we face a two-stage
decision process with the possibility of recourse: the choice between X or Y
— and Z — can be postponed until we know whether the bridge is open.
Stated in this way the observed inconsistency might disappear, though this
should be contrasted with the actual choices made by drivers. In any case,
Allais’ paradox and other empirical violations of the postulates of expected
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utility theory have motivated alternative theories of choice. We consider
two of them in the next subsections.
3.2 Dual theory of choice
While expected utility introduces risk-aversion by magnifying the effects of
bad outcomes through a nonlinear transformation of the cost c(X), Yaari’s
dual theory of choice [54] uses the idea that a risk-averse agent tends to
overstate the probability of bad outcomes. An agent is then characterized
by a continuous nondecreasing distortion map h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with h(0) = 0
and h(1) = 1, so that the probability P(X > x) is distorted as h(P(X > x)).
Risk-aversion corresponds to h(x) ≥ x for all x ∈ [0, 1], while a risk-prone
agent satisfies the reverse inequality.
The function x 7→ h(P(X > x)) is a decumulative distribution so we may
find a random variable Xh such that P(Xh > x) = h(P(X > x)), and we
may describe the agent’s preferences E by the functional
ρh(X) = E(Xh) (3.4)
or more explicitely in terms of the distribution of X
ρh(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
[h(P(X>x))−1]dx+
∫
∞
0
h(P(X>x))dx. (3.5)
This is a law invariant risk measure which is also positively homogeneous and
normalized on constants. It is called a distortion risk measure. In particular
it is always translation invariant as opposed to the expected utility maps ρc.
A characterization of the preferences that can be represented in this form
is given in [54]. Namely, assuming that all prospects satisfy X(ω) ∈ [0, 1]
almost surely, a preorder E on X can be characterized by a distortion risk
measure ρh if and only if it is law invariant (A1) and satisfies
(A∗2) L
1-continuity: the sets {Y ∈ X : Y E X} and {Y ∈ X : X E Y } are
closed for convergence in the L1-norm.
(A∗3) dual independence: if X,Y,Z ∈ X are pairwise comonotone and
X E Y then αX + (1−α)Z E αY + (1−α)Z for all α ∈ [0, 1].
(A∗4) monotonicity under first-order stochastic dominance: if
FX(t) ≥ FY (t) for all t ∈ R then X E Y .
The main difference with expected utility theory is the substitution of inde-
pendence by dual independence which uses the concept of comonotonicity.
For our purposes it suffices to say that X and Y are comonotone iff there is
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a third variable U and non-decreasing maps f and g such that X = f(U)
and Y = g(U). An alternative set of axioms which ensure a representation
by distortion risk measures is given in [9] by considering a prospect space X
of bounded random variables on a standard atomless probability space and
continuity for the L∞ norm.
Although the maps ρh are always translation invariant, they may fail to be
additively consistent. As we show next the latter is a stringent condition
which is only satisfied for h(x) = x in which case ρh(X) = E(X). For h
concave and twice differentiable this result was established in [27, Luan] (see
also [23, Heilpern] and [22, Goovaerts et al.]). Our proof does not require
any a priori regularity on h beyond continuity and monotonicity. It exploits
the following elementary fact.
Lemma 3.1. Let h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be continuous and suppose that for some
0 < p < 1 the limit L = limq→0+(h(q) − h(pq))/q exists. Then h is right
differentiable at 0 with h′+(0) = L/(1−p).
Proof. Take ε > 0 and choose δ > 0 so that for all q ∈ (0, δ) we have
L− ε ≤ h(q)− h(pq)
q
≤ L+ ε.
For each x ∈ (0, δ) we may take q = pjx in order to get
(L− ε)pj ≤ h(p
jx)− h(pj+1x)
x
≤ (L+ ε)pj .
Summing over all j ≥ 0 we get a telescopic series that simplifies to
L− ε
1− p ≤
h(x)− h(0)
x
≤ L+ ε
1− p .
from which the conclusion follows since ε was arbitrary.
Theorem 3.2. The only distortion risk measure ρh that is additive consis-
tent is ρh(X) = E(X) which corresponds to h(x) = x.
Proof. Take Bp and Bq independent Bernoullis with success probabilities
p, q ∈ [0, 1]. From Lemma 2.1 we know that ρh is additive so that
ρh(Bp +Bq) = ρh(Bp) + ρh(Bq). (3.6)
Denoting p¯ = 1−p and q¯ = 1−q we have
P(Bp +Bq > x) =


1 if x ≤ 0
1− p¯q¯ if 0 ≤ x < 1
pq if 1 ≤ x < 2
0 if x ≥ 2
(3.7)
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and then using (3.5) we find ρh(Bp +Bq) = h(1−p¯q¯) + h(pq). Similarly we
get ρh(Bp) = h(p) and ρ(Bq) = h(q) so that (3.6) becomes
h(1 − p¯q¯) + h(pq) = h(p) + h(q) (3.8)
which can also be written as
h(p + q(1−p))− h(p) = h(q)− h(pq). (3.9)
Since h is monotone we can find p˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that h′(p˜) exists, so that
(3.9) implies
lim
q→0+
[h(q)− h(p˜q)]/q = h′(p˜)(1−p˜)
and then Lemma 3.1 gives h′+(0) = h
′(p˜). Using this fact and dividing (3.9)
by q(1−p) with q → 0+, it then follows that h has a right derivative at
each point p ∈ [0, 1) and in fact h′+(p) = h′+(0) is constant. It follows that
h is Lipschitz continuous and then absolutely continuous so that it can be
recovered by integrating its derivative. Hence h is affine and since h(0) = 0
and h(1) = 1 we conclude that h(·) must be the identity map.
3.3 Rank-dependent expected utilities
Expected utility theory and the dual theory of choice are complementary
and can be combined by considering preference functionals of the form
ρhc (X) = c
−1(E(c(Xh))) = c−1(E(c(X)h))
where c is a utility function and h is a distortion map. More explicitly
ρhc (X) = c
−1
(∫ 0
−∞
[h(P(c(X)>x))−1]dx + ∫∞0 h(P(c(X)>x))dx). (3.10)
Note that ρhc does not change under affine transformations of c(·), so we
may assume c(0) = 0. For h(x) = x we recover expected utilities, while
c(x) = x gives the distortion risk measures. The functionals ρhc are called
rank-dependent expected utilities and have been considered by several au-
thors including Quiggin [42], Wakker [52], and Chateauneuf [6], who provide
axiomatic characterizations of the preorders E that can be represented in
this form. Note that ρhc is normalized on constants but, just as for expected
utilities, they need not be translation invariant nor additive consistent. The
next result characterizes when these properties hold. This result was proved
in [27, Luan] assuming c(·) and h(·) twice differentiable and increasing, with
h concave and c convex. An alternative proof was given in [22, Goovaerts
et al.] under the same hypothesis but assuming in addition that c(·) ad-
mits a McLaurin expansion. Our proof rests on the techniques developed in
the previous sections and avoids such a priori regularity which is however
obtained as a consequence.
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Theorem 3.3. A rank dependent expected utility ρhc is translation invariant
iff c(·) is an exponential function or the identity. Moreover, the only ρhc
which are additive consistent are the entropic risk measures: h is the identity
and c is either an exponential function or the identity.
Proof. Let us first assume that ρhc is translation invariant. Take X = zBp
with z > 0 and Bp a Bernoulli. We then have
P(c(X +m) > x) =


1 if x < c(m)
p if c(m) ≤ x < c(m+ z)
0 if x ≥ c(m+ z)
so that using (3.10) and distiguishing cases according to the signs of m and
m+ z, we get in all situations
ρhc (X +m) = c
−1
(
h(p)c(m+z) + (1−h(p))c(m)).
In particular for m = 0 we have ρhc (X) = c
−1(h(p)c(z)) so that the transla-
tion invariance ρhc (X +m) = ρ
h
c (X) +m yields
h(p)c(m + z) + (1−h(p))c(m) = c (c−1(h(p)c(z)) +m) .
Letting ε = c−1 (h(p)c(z)) > 0 we get the analog of (3.1)
c(ε)[c(m + z)− c(m)] = c(z)[c(m + ε)− c(m)]. (3.11)
In the case z < 0, noting that Bp ∼ 1 − Bp¯ with p¯ = 1−p, we may write
X + m = −zBp¯ + (m + z) so we get a similar formula for ρhc (X + m) by
replacing p by p¯, z by −z, and m by m+ z, namely
ρhc (X +m) = c
−1
(
h(p¯)c(m) + (1−h(p¯))c(m + z))
from which we obtain again (3.11) this time with ε = c−1((1−h(p¯))c(z)) < 0.
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we deduce that c(·) is either an
exponential function or the identity map, which proves our first claim.
Let us assume next that ρhc satisfies the stronger condition of additive con-
sistency, and let us show that in this case h(x) = x. The case when c(·) is
the identity was settled in the previous section so we just consider the expo-
nential case c(x) = [eβx − 1]/β. Let us consider two independent Bernoullis
Bp and Bq so that for all z > 0 we have
ρhc (zBp + zBq) = ρ
h
c (zBp) + ρ
h
c (zBq). (3.12)
The formulas given in the first part of the proof show that the right-hand
side is equal to c−1 (h(p)c(z)) + c−1 (h(q)c(z)). To compute the expression
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on the left we observe that P(c(zBp + zBq) > x) = P(Bp +Bq > c
−1(x)/z)
and we may use (3.7) to obtain
ρhc (zBp + zBq) = c
−1
(∫ c(z)
0 h (1−p¯q¯) dx+
∫ c(2z)
c(z) h (pq) dx
)
= c−1 (c(z)h (1−p¯q¯) + [c(2z)−c(z)]h (pq)) .
Plugging these formulas into (3.12) we have
c(z)h (1−p¯q¯) + (c(2z)−c(z))h (pq) = c (c−1(h(p)c(z))+c−1(h(q)c(z))) .
Using the exponential form of c(·) the left-hand side is given by
eβz−1
β
h (1− p¯q¯) + e2βz−eβz
β
h (pq)
whereas after some manipulation the right-hand side is seen to be
eβz−1
β
(
h(p) + h(q) + h(p)h(q)[eβz − 1])
so that the equation simplifies to
h(1− p¯q¯) + h(pq)− h(p)− h(q) = eβz (h(p)h(q) − h(pq)) .
Since this holds for all z > 0 we deduce that for all p, q ∈ [0, 1]
h(p)h(q) = h(pq),
h(1 − p¯q¯) + h(pq) = h(p) + h(q).
The latter is the same as (3.8) so we may use the argument in Theorem 3.2
to conclude that h is the identity.
4 A remark on dynamic risk measures
Time consistency is a central issue in multistage decision problems under risk
where decisions are taken sequentially along periods t = 0, 1, . . . , T . It has
been thoroughly investigated using the concept of dynamic risk measures:
a sequence of risk measures, one for each period, usually obtained by iter-
ated composition of conditional risk maps that progressively incorporate the
random information revealed along time (see for instance [7, 11, 40, 45] and
references therein). This approach structurally avoids the inconsistencies
and allows to deal with non-additive risk measures such as VaR or AVaR.
Moreover, the framework provides a dynamic programming recursion that
allows to characterize and eventually compute optimal solutions.
Route choice can also be seen as a sequential decision process where at
each step the driver is located at an intermediate node where he must chose
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the next arc to follow. This view is actually the basis of most shortest path
algorithms. It is then tempting to use dynamic risk measures to model route
choice under risk. However, the notion of period is not obvious here. One
option is to take the set of nodes in the network as state space and associate
periods with link choice decisions so that time corresponds to the number
of link choices that have been made so far. Naturally, one has to deal with
the fact that the same node can be reached after different number of steps,
depending on the number of links in the actual path followed. In particular
it is unclear how to define the planning horizon T , maybe as the maximum
number of links in all paths connecting the origin to the destination.
Although one can find ways to frame route choice as a multistage decision
process, we do not pursue this goal here. Instead, we point out yet another
difficulty in this approach which has to do with the network representation.
We illustrate this with a very simple example on the network in figure 4
with independent normally distributed times X ∼ N(10, 1), Y ∼ N(10, 1)
and Z ∼ N(20, 3). Consider the non additive risk measure ρ = AVaRp, with
p chosen so that for all normal variables we have ρ(X) = E(X) + σ(X). By
j
s d
X Y
Z
Figure 4: Counterexample with normal distributions.
independence, an iterated dynamic risk measure will evaluate the risk for
the upper route as ρ(X+ρ(Y |X)) = ρ(X+ρ(Y )) = ρ(X)+ρ(Y ) = 22. This
is larger than ρ(Z) = 20+
√
3 which is then the optimal choice. Suppose now
that we merge both upper links into a single arc with time U = X + Y ∼
N(20, 2), which is just a matter of how we decide to model the network. In
this case the upper route has risk ρ(U) = 20+
√
2 and has displaced Z as the
optimal solution. The conflict arises since there is no clear notion of period
to guide our choice of the representation of the network. This will occur
whenever one deals with non-additive risk measures, while for additive risk
measures the conflict disappears.
5 Related work
Risk-sensitive route choice is a relatively new research area which has been
growing steadily in the last decade or so. General discussions on risk eval-
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uation in the context of route choice can be found in Bates et al. [4],
Noland [36], and Hollander [24]. A mean-stdev risk model for atomic and
non-atomic traffic equilibrium was investigated by Nikolova and Stier-Moses
[35], distinguishing the case when only the expected values depend on the
traffic intensity from the more difficult case where also the variance is flow-
dependent. A similar traffic equilibrium model was considered by Ordon˜ez
and Stier-Moses in [39], in which risk-aversion is treated by aggregating a
variability index to the expected value. This is compared to a model based
on α-percentiles as well as a novel approach that uses ideas from robust
optimization. Since computing an α-percentile equilibrium is difficult, they
investigate two classes of approximations which provide a better fit than
a standard Wardrop model. Percentile equilibria in route choice were also
investigated by Nie [31].
Algorithms to compute optimal routes for the mean-stdev objective were
studied by Nikolova [33] and Nikolova et al. [34]. Despite the combinato-
rial nature of the problem and the nonlinear objective function, an exact
algorithm with sub-exponential complexity nO(logn) is found. The main dif-
ficulty here comes from the non-additivity of the standard deviation. As
illustrated by the example in the Introduction, the optimality of a path is
not inherited by its subpaths, which prevents the use of dynamic program-
ming and makes the problem much more difficult to solve. In contrast, when
using additive consistent risk measures this difficulty disappears and route
choice reduces to a standard shortest path problem.
A different approach to risk-averse path choice considers user preferences
based on the on-time arrival probability. This was studied by Nie and Wu
[32], addressing the question of whether or not route optimality is inherited
by subpaths. An algorithm for this objective function was also given by
Nikolova et al. [34]. A related approach by Nie et al. [30, 53] reconsiders
the route choice question under stochastic dominance constraints.
Our contribution partially differs from the previous ones as it uses risk mea-
sures to quantify route preferences. Exploiting the axiomatic frameworks
provided by the theories of choice we showed that, in wide classes of risk
functionals, the entropic risk measures emerge as the only ones that guar-
antee a form of consistency in route choice. In this light, all the models
discussed above are susceptible to exhibit inconsistencies. While this raises
a serious question about the capacity of these models to capture rational
behavior, it does not invalidate them. From a practical viewpoint, all these
models may plausibly describe the behavior of some drivers and —after all—
no one has yet proved that drivers are actually consistent in their decisions!
From a theoretical perspective our results require the preferences to be de-
fined and satisfy additive consistency throughout the space L∞(Ω,F ,P).
22 R Cominetti and A. Torrico
This might be asking too much as one could argue that drivers are only
able to make choices in a much narrower subset of random variables which
might not be even a linear subspace (e.g. a set of uniformly bounded non-
negative variables). In summary, while our contribution reveals some strong
and interesting consequences of additive consistency, there is still work to
be done before one can provide firm recommendations as to which is the
most appropriate way to model route choice under risk.
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